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Abstract: The threat of Android malware has increased owing to the increasing 
popularity of smartphones. Once an Android smartphone is infected with malware, the 
user suffers from various damages, such as the theft of personal information stored in the 
smartphones, the unintentional sending of short messages to premium-rate numbers 
without the user’s knowledge, and the ability for the infected smartphones to be remotely 
operated and used for other malicious attacks. However, there are currently insufficient 
defense mechanisms against Android malware. This study proposes a new method to 
detect Android malware. The new method analyzes only manifest files that are required in 
Android applications. It realizes a lightweight approach for detection, and its effectiveness 
is experimentally confirmed by employing real samples of Android malware. The result 
shows that the new method can effectively detect Android malware, even when the 
sample is unknown. 
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1. Introduction
With the rapid entry of smartphones into daily lives, Android malware has been rapidly 
spreading. The Android operating system (OS) is an easy target for attackers, because the market 
share of Android has increased, and many Android applications are written in the Java 
programming language. 
According to a global survey of the smartphone OS market, Android possessed 68.8% of the 
market share in 2012 [1], implying that the popularity of Android has undergone significant 
growth. It is easy for malware to infect Android smartphones because of the large number of 
phones. Moreover, Android applications are easy targets for reverse engineering, which is a 
specific characteristic of Java applications in general, and which is often abused by malicious 
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attackers, who attempt to embed malicious program into benign applications, hence creating 
subspecies of existing malware. Yajin et al. [2] illustrated that 86.0% of Android malware are 
created by conversion from benign applications. Hence, Android is considered to be an easy 
target for malicious attackers, and therefore, the privacy and integrity of the user’s data are 
seriously threatened. 
There have been numerous studies focusing on the detection of Android malware. One of the 
popular approaches includes signature-based methods, which extract signatures from malware 
samples. While it is effective for detecting known malware, it is inadequate for detecting 
unknown malware. Iland et al. [3] suggested a detection method at the network level. They 
observed network traffic originating from a sample application and tried to detect malware by 
comparing with DNS-based and IP-address-based blacklists. This method cannot detect 
unknown malware, because the blacklists are generated from known malicious activities. Isohara 
et al. [4] presented a method for detecting malware by analyzing attributes of files within sample 
applications. While this approach can detect only some unknown malware that are undetected by 
blacklist or signature-based methods, the analysis cost depends on the number of files within 
sample applications. Enck et al. [5] proposed a lightweight method to block the installation of 
applications that have dangerous permissions or intent filter (a mechanism for realizing 
cooperation between Android applications) combinations. However, the method may lead to 
incorrect detections, because the information used in the method is not sufficient to differentiate 
malware from benign applications. Wu et al. [6] developed a system to provide a static analysis 
paradigm for detecting malware, called DroidMat. They obtained some distinguishable 
characteristics such as permissions, components (essential functions such as Activity, Service 
and Receiver) and API calls by analyzing manifest files and smali files (disassembly codes). This 
system can discriminate between malware and benign applications. However, the cost of their 
analysis depends on the size and numbers of smali files. Our preliminary study measured the 
average file sizes and number of files that are the main resources in Android applications. Table 
1 and 2 show the results. We investigated 30 benign samples and 30 malware samples. 
 
Table 1. Average : File size (KB). 
   smali files Resources  Manifest file  
30 Benign samples  6305  4759  7  
30 Malware samples  3036  1431  4  
 
Table 2. Average : number of files. 
   smali files Resources  Manifest file  
30 Benign samples  674  385  1  
30 Malware samples  249  101  1  
 
 
From Table 1 and 2, we can observe that the cost of analyzing smali files is higher than that of 
manifest file. 
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This study proposes a new method for detecting Android malware by analyzing only manifest 
files. Each Android application must have a manifest file, which presents essential information 
about the application. Our preliminary investigations revealed that there are certain differences 
between the manifest files of benign applications and malware. Our proposed method is based on 
the characteristic analysis of Android manifest files and is effective for detecting well-known 
existing malware and unknown malware. Moreover, the cost is low, because this method 
analyzes only a manifest file. Table 1 and 2 show a manifest file is usually a small file. 
The remained of this study is organized as follows: Section 2 proposes our new method. 
Section 3 describes the experiment used to demonstrate the effectiveness of the new detection 
method. Section 4 concludes this paper and discusses the possible future extension of the 
proposed method. 
2. New Method for Detecting Android Malware 
This study proposes a new method for detecting Android malware by analyzing only manifest 
files. Android applications consist of the following resources: a manifest file, application 
programs for Dalvik virtual machine (VM), and application resources. Figure 1 shows an 
Android application package (.apk), which includes a manifest file. 
 
Figure 1. Android application package (.apk). 
 
The manifest file takes the form of “AndroidManifest.xml,” which must be present in all 
Android applications. Application programs are collected as “classes.dex.” Application resources 
consist of pictures, music, and some xml files, which describe the layout information. 
Android malware is detected by the following steps: [Step 1] Extract specific information 
described in the manifest file of a sample application. [Step 2] Compare the extracted 
information with the keyword lists that are provided in this new method. Then, calculate the 
malignancy score of the sample by comparing the information in Step 1 with the lists. [Step 3] 
Compare the malignancy score in Step 2 and the threshold values, which are set by this new 
method. If the malignancy score exceeds the threshold value, the sample is judged as malware. 
Figure 2 shows the flow of the new detection method. 
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Figure 2. Flow of Detecting Android Malware. 
2.1. Extract information items 
 Manifest files have essential information about Android applications, such as the version 
number of an application, the name of a package, required permission, and the API level. The 
format of the manifest file is identical in both benign applications and malware. However, there 
are certain differences in the characteristics of several information items. We investigated 30 
benign samples and 30 malware samples, giving a total of 60 samples. We selected specific 
information items that show a wide variety of malware as compared to benign applications. 
Table 3 shows six information items that are extracted from manifest files and that are used to 
detect Android malware by the proposed method. The items are represented as text strings or 
numbers. 
Table 3. List of information items. 
(1) Permission 
(2) Intent filter (action) 
(3) Intent filter (category) 
(4) Process name 
(5) Intent filter (priority) 
(6) Number of redefined permission 
2.2. Keyword lists and malignancy score 
 With this new method, several keyword lists are compiled for an application. Benign or 
malicious strings in a manifest file are recorded in the keyword list. We make four types of 
keyword lists: (1) Permission, (2) Intent filter (action), (3) Intent filter (category), and (4) 
Process name. Because (5) Intent filter (priority) and (6) Number of redefined permission are 
represented by an integer, and not a text string, we have no keyword lists for them. Figure 3 
counts the number of keywords, which are classified as “Permission” items. 
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Figure 3. Permission keywords in each set of 30 samples. 
Figure 3 shows the occurrences of popular permission keywords. This figure shows that the 
permissions which are related to short message service (SMS), such as SEND_SMS, 
RECEIVE_SMS, and READ_SMS, are frequently used by malware samples. These permissions 
are registered with the keyword list as malicious strings. A similar process is also performed for 
(2) Intent filter (action), (3) Intent filter (category), and (4) Process name. We have four keyword 
lists, which are shown in Table 4. Most keywords are considered to be malicious, while some are 
classified as benign. 
Table 4. Keyword lists. 
(List 1) Permission 
1. READ_SMS 
2. SEND_SMS 
3. RECEIVE_SMS 
4. WRITE_SMS 
5. PROCESS_OUTGOING_CALLS 
6. MOUNT_UNMOUNT_FILESYSTEMS 
 
(List 2) Intent-filter (action)  
1. BOOT_COMPLETED 
2. SMS_RECEIVED 
        3. CONNECTIVITY_CHANGE 
4. USER_PRESENT 
5. PHONE_STATE  
6. NEW_OUTGOING_CALL 
7. UNINSTALL_SHORTCUT 
 
(List 3) Intent-filter (category)  
1. HOME 
2. BROWSABLE (benign keyword) 
 
 
7. READ_HISTORY_BOOKMARKS 
8. WRITE_HISTORY_BOOKMARKS 
9. READ_LOGS 
10. INSTALL_PACKAGES 
11. MODIFY_PHONE_STATE 
 
 
 
8. INSTALL_SHORTCUT 
9. left_up 
10. right_up 
11. left_down 
12. right_down 
13. SIG_STR 
14. VIEW (benign keyword) 
 
(List 4) Process name 
1. remote2 
2. main 
3. two 
4. three 
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After we obtained the keyword lists, the malignancy score for the above four information 
items are calculated. This process is performed by classifying the keywords as being benign or 
malicious. The malignancy score is calculated by formula (1). P =   M   −   BE  (1)  
where P: malignancy score, M: number of malicious strings, B: number of benign strings,  
E: number of total information items. 
Table 5 shows an example. This sample uses five permissions items.  
Table 5. Permissions keywords in a sample. 
<uses-permission android:name=”android.permission.INTERNET” /> 
<uses-permission android:name=”android.permission.READ PHONE STATE” /> 
<uses-permission android:name=”android.permission.READ SMS” /> 
<uses-permission android:name=”android.permission.RECEIVE SMS” /> 
<uses-permission android:name=”android.permission.SEND SMS” /> 
 
Among these five permissions, READ_SMS, RECEIVE SMS, and SEND SMS are recorded 
in the keyword list and are classified as malicious strings in Table 4. Then, the malignancy score 
of this sample is calculated by formula (2). P =   3   −   05 = 0.6 (2)  
Similar calculations are also performed for (2) Intent filter (action), (3) Intent filter (category), 
and (4) Process name. With regards to (5) Intent filter (priority), the set-up value is counted and 
used for the judgment in Step 3. (6) Number of redefined permission is also counted and 
considered. 
2.3. Thresholds and judgment 
 The proposed method provides threshold values for the malignancy score. We use a data 
mining tool, Weka [7], to determine the threshold values. As with the four categories of 
information items (1), (2), (3), and (4), the threshold values are set using the Weka J48 
algorithm, which is based on a decision tree. We use both benign samples and malicious samples 
for machine learning. Specific samples are explained in Section 3. With regards to the threshold 
value for items (5) and (6), we set the threshold value at 1000 for (5) and 3 for (6) based on the 
result of our preliminary analysis, which was described in Section 2.1. 
 Judgment for an application sample is performed on the basis of conditions 1, 2, and formula 
(3), which are given below. Condition 1 describes the characteristics of malware. Condition 2 is 
made to avoid incorrect judgments. In formula (3), the SCORE refers to the final malignancy 
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score of the sample. C1 and C2 count the number of items satisfied by a sample in condition 1, 
and condition 2, respectively. 
 
 Condition 1: 
l Malignancy score is greater than the threshold value determined by Weka.  
l Count of Intent filter (priority) is greater than the threshold value. 
l Count of redefined permissions is greater than the threshold value 
Condition 2: 
l Malignancy score of (2) Intent filter (action) is negative (< 0) 
l Malignancy score of (3) Intent filter (category) is negative (< 0) 
Criteria formula: SCORE =   C1 − C2 (3)  
If the final SCORE is greater than or equal to 1, the sample application is considered to be 
malware. 
3. Experiment 
 To evaluate the performance of the proposed method, we conducted the following experiment 
with Android application samples. 
3.1. Overview of the experiment 
 We collected 235 benign application samples and 130 malware samples. Benign samples 
were collected from Google Play [8] and some related markets. Malware samples were obtained 
from a web site that provides samples for research purposes [9]. All samples have a unique MD5 
hash value and are classified into two groups: “Learning data” and “Test data.” Learning data is 
used to determine the suitable threshold values used by Weka, and the keyword lists are the same 
as in Table 4. Test data is used to evaluate the proposed new method. In this experiment, the 
samples are first analyzed by VirusTotal [10], which is an on-line scanning tool for malware. We 
classified a malware sample into the Learning data if the first registered data is before September 
2011. The remaining malware samples are used for Test data. This date is selected to enable the 
acquisition of a sufficient number of malware samples for learning and testing. We can treat 
malicious Learning data as known samples and malicious Testing data as unknown samples. 
Note that malicious Testing data include samples that are not detected by signature-based 
methods. Incidentally, benign Learning data and Test data were randomly selected from the 
collected benign application samples. Table 6 shows the number of samples that were used in 
this experiment. 
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Table 6. Number of samples used in the experiment. 
 Learning data Test data Total 
Benign samples 60 175 235 
Malware samples 34 96 130 
 
3.2. Result of the evaluation 
 Table 7 shows the result of the experiment. It shows that the correct ratio of detecting benign 
samples is 91.4%, detecting malware samples is 87.5%, and it is 90.0% in total. This result 
indicated that the proposed method can accurately classify Android applications. The samples 
that are used as Learning data consist of only those whose first detected time is earlier than that 
of any Test data samples. Therefore, the proposed method is shown to successfully extract 
essential information from manifest files, although it only learns from old samples for which the 
first detected times were before September 2011. Therefore, it can detect unknown malware 
samples successfully. 
Table 7. Result of the experiment. 
 Correct detection (%) Incorrect detection (%) 
Benign samples 91.4 8.6 
Malware samples 87.5 12.5 
Total 90.0 10.0 
 
3.3. Discussion 
 Some malware samples were not detected by the proposed method. We found that the 
proposed method was inadequate for detecting adware samples. In addition to actions that 
display some advertisements superfluously, there is often a marginal difference between a benign 
application and adware. This means that both manifest files appear to be similar, and it is 
difficult for the proposed method to effectively detect adware based on the manifest analysis. 
4. Conclusion and Future works 
This paper proposed a new detection method for Android malware. The advantage of this new 
method is that it uses only manifest files to detect malware. Manifest files are required in all 
Android applications, and thus, the proposed method is applicable to all Android applications. 
Our results show that the proposed method can detect unknown malware samples that are 
undetectable by a simple signature-based approach. Moreover, the cost of analyzing only the 
manifest file is extremely low. The new method can also be combined with other methods to 
realize an even more precise detection method. 
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Our evaluation uses only a small number of samples; only 365 samples in total. In future, we 
plan to collect additional samples to obtain more precise results for the evaluation experiments.  
The proposed method extracts six types of information from manifest files and uses them to 
detect Android malware. The essential information items can be easily changed, and we should 
closely observe trends in Android malware to determine whether to keep or revise the effective 
information items in the manifest file.  
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